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Abstract 
This paper discusses the financial risks faced by the UK Pension Protection Fund 
(PPF) and what, if anything, it can do about them. It draws lessons from the 
regulatory regimes under which other financial institutions, such as banks and 
insurance companies, operate and asks why pension funds are treated differently. It 
also reviews the experience with other government-sponsored insurance schemes, 
such as the US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, upon which the PPF is 
modelled. We conclude that the PPF will live under the permanent risk of insolvency 
as a consequence of the moral hazard, adverse selection, and, especially, systemic 
risks that it faces.  
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1 Introduction 
The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) is a UK Government-sponsored insurance scheme 
established by the 2004 Pensions Act with the aim of protecting members of private 
sector defined benefit (DB) schemes whose firms become insolvent and have 
insufficient funds in their pension scheme: this is to reassure them that they will still 
receive most of the pension benefits that they were expecting. The PPF came into 
operation in April 2005. Participation is mandatory, and pension funds are taken over 
by the PPF when the sponsoring employer has become insolvent and the pension 
scheme has insufficient assets to buy out the PPF level of benefits with a life 
company. Once in the PPF, the scheme can never leave. 
The PPF protects 100% of the pension for members above scheme pension age, and 
90% of the promised pension for members below scheme pension age (up to a 
maximum of £25,000 at age 65) using a mixture of scheme individual rates and 
standardised rules.  Pensions in payment are subject to limited priced indexation (LPI) 
at 2.5%, while deferred pensions are subject to LPI at 5%. Survivors’ benefits are also 
protected.  
The compensation is funded by taking on the assets of insolvent schemes and by 
charging a levy on schemes. The levy is charged to all private sector DB and hybrid 
occupational pension schemes and is collected by the Pensions Regulator. The levy 
has three components:  
 Pension Protection Levy 
o a ‘scheme factors’ element which depends on the number of members 
and the balance between active and retired members 
o a ‘risk factors’ element (at least 80% of the total charge, although not 
raised in the first year of operation) which is linked to such factors as 
the level of underfunding, investment strategy and the sponsor’s credit 
rating. 
 Administration Levy, covering set-up and ongoing costs of the PPF. 
 Fraud Compensation Levy. 
The governance and management of the PPF are in the hands of a Board which is 
responsible for paying pension compensation, paying fraud compensation, 
determining the three levies, setting investment strategy, and appointing at least two 
independent fund managers.  
The Government has made it clear that it will not underwrite the PPF. Instead its 
stated objective is that the PPF must survive on the basis of its powers to set levies 
and determine its own liabilities. In this paper, we consider the feasibility of this 
objective (section 6). In order to do this, we need to assess the financial risks that the 
PPF faces (section 5). But before doing that, it will be instructive to consider how 
other financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, are regulated and 
deal with the financial risks they face (section 2), what makes pension funds different 
from these other institutions (section 3), and how other government-sponsored 
insurance schemes deal with the risks that they face (section 4).  
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2 The Financial Regulation of Banks and Life Assurance Companies 
2.1 Banks 
One of the most important trends in financial regulation is the move towards a 
common risk-based framework of regulatory capital requirements for financial 
institutions. For example, the UK financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), currently has separate sets of financial regulations (prudential sourcebooks) 
for banks, building societies, friendly societies, insurers and investment firms, but its 
ultimate objective is to harmonise these regulations and introduce an integrated 
prudential sourcebook (PSB) based principally on that for banks. Similar convergence 
processes are occurring throughout the EU. Underlying this regulatory convergence is 
the recognition by regulators that the risk management practices of banks are well 
ahead of those of other institutions. These other institutions – and especially insurance 
companies – are therefore being encouraged to see the risk management practices of 
banks as role models they should emulate.  
Banks were the first set of institutions to be subject to a formal set of regulatory 
capital requirements. Banks’ capital regulations were enshrined in 1988 Basel Accord 
which came into force in 1992 (Basel Committee (1988)). The Basel regime imposed 
two minimum standards of capital adequacy: an assets-to-capital multiple and a risk-
based capital ratio of 8% of risk-weighted on-balance sheet assets plus off-balance 
sheet exposures, irrespective of the maturity or volatility of the values of the assets 
held. Two types of regulatory capital were permitted: tier 1 or core capital (equity and 
non-cumulative perpetual preferred shares less goodwill), and tier 2 or supplementary 
capital (subordinated debt with an original maturity in excess of 5 years and 
cumulative perpetual preferred shares). 
However, the Basel regime soon revealed itself to be both naive and highly 
inadequate (see, e.g., Dowd (1997), Jackson et al (1997)). Three major weaknesses in 
particular stand out. The first is that the 8% ratio on which it was based was arbitrary: 
it was chosen to ensure that there no big jumps in most banks’ regulatory capital 
requirements, and there was no attempt to justify in terms of it satisfying some desired 
target probability of bank insolvency. The second was that the regulations were 
littered with arbitrary provisions over such issues as netting arrangements, the so-
called risk weights to be applied, and the like. These created considerable scope for 
regulatory arbitrage: banks could move into positions that were ‘rewarded’ by the 
regulations and away from positions that were ‘penalised’ by them, and in so doing 
reduce their regulatory capital charges. The third and possibly most serious weakness 
was in the building-block approach itself: by giving each asset a fixed ‘risk weight’, it 
implicitly contradicted the most basic principle of portfolio theory, namely, that the 
risk of a position is (special cases aside) not a function of the position itself, but a 
function of how the position relates to the rest of the portfolio of which it is a part. 
The whole notion of fixed ‘risk weights’ makes no sense if there is any diversification 
within a portfolio, i.e., it makes no sense unless one assumes that all risk factors are 
perfectly correlated. The adding-up approach therefore penalises globally diversified 
banks in comparison with specialists trading only in single asset classes. To add to 
which, there was also the difficulty that the risk weights were arbitrary and often 
made no market sense. So, for example, a position in UK or US government debt was 
assumed to be riskless, but this ignores the point that such positions are still exposed 
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to market risk – the risk of falling asset prices – even if one assumes that any credit 
risk involved is negligible. 
The original Basel Accord was also soon seen to be excessively rigid and dated. Its 
datedness was highlighted by the rapid rise of value-at-risk (VaR) models in the early 
1990s and by widespread dissatisfaction with the fact that the regime did not allow 
banks to make use of these models in setting their regulatory capital requirements. 
However, after extensive discussions, an Amended Basel Accord – known as Basel l 
– was approved and came into effect in 1998.  
This permitted banks a choice of two models for determining their trading book 
capital: they could use a version of the original ‘standardised model’ (or building-
block model) and they could use the ‘internal model’ (or regulatory VaR) approach. 
This involved the use of a bank’s own VaR model based on the VaR calibrated on the 
99% confidence level and a 10-day holding or horizon period. The regulations 
imposed minimum standards on the sample sizes on which VaR estimates were to be 
made, on the types of back-test (or model validation tests) to be performed, and so on.  
As an extra safeguard, Basel 1 set the capital requirement at the higher of the current 
VaR and a multiple of the average VaR over the previous 60 days. This multiplier was 
another arbitrary parameter set at between 3 and 4 at the discretion of the bank’s 
regulatory supervisor based on his or her assessment of the model’s backtesting 
performance, and was designed as a hedge against model and parameter risk, 
inaccurate assessments of credit risks, operational risks and unusual market moves. 
The models used for determining regulatory capital also had to be the ones that were 
actually used in the daily risk management of the bank.  
The Amended Accord also allowed a third tier of sub-supplementary capital (short-
term subordinated debt with an original maturity in excess of two years) to be 
allocated against the market risk of the trading book.  
Banks had to first allocate tier 1 and tier 2 capital to meet credit risk capital 
requirements sufficient to cover 8% of risk-weighted assets. Then tier 3 capital was 
allocated to satisfy a second capital-assets ratio.1 Thus, by 1998, banks had to satisfy 
three capital adequacy standards: a maximum assets-to-capital ratio of 20, a credit-
risk capital charge of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets both on- and off-balance 
sheet, and a minimum market-risk capital charge to cover traded instruments in the 
trading book on and off balance sheet (see, e.g., Crouhy et al (1998)). 
The acceptance of internal risk-based (IRB) models for determining capital 
requirements was a revolutionary departure for supervisors, but it was driven, in part, 
by the underlying complexity of the products in bank portfolios and the proprietary 
                                               
1
 The denominator of the new ratio is the sum of the risk-weighted assets and 12.5 times the market 
risk capital charge (where 12.5 is the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8%). The numerator of 
the second ratio is the sum of the bank’s tier 1, tier 2 and tier 3 capital. Tier 3 capital could be used 
solely to meet the market risk capital charge, while tier 1 and 2 capital could also be used to satisfy the 
market risk capital charge once the credit risk allocation had been met in full. However, at least 50% of 
the bank’s qualifying capital had to be tier 1 (with term subordinated debt not exceeding 50%) and the 
sum of tiers 2 and 3 capital allocated to market risk, not exceeding 250% of the tier 1 capital allocated 
to market risk (so that at least 28.57% of market risk capital had to be tier1). 
 5 
expertise required by banks in pricing and trading these products: the regulators 
recognised that capital requirements for banks’ options and swap books could only be 
assessed sensibly by using the banks’ own IRB models. However, the regulators were 
also aware of the importance of the need to supplement VaR modelling with stress 
tests, and regulations also stipulated some of the conditions that stress tests were to 
meet.  
Despite the theoretically superior structure of the internal model compared with the 
standardised model, some regulators still had doubts about the ability of banks to 
correctly model the principal (i.e., directional, spread, curve, and liquidity) risks 
contained in their portfolios (see, e.g., Kupiec and O’Brien (1995)). Credit rating 
agencies such as Standard & Poors (1996) also expressed concern that the amount of 
regulatory capital would fall as the high credit risk charge under the 1988 Accord for 
on-balance sheet holdings of bonds and equities would be replaced by a much lower 
specific risk capital charge under Basel 1. S&P argued that the market risks of trading 
operations are swamped by other more difficult to quantify risks such as operational 
risk (arising from systems failure and employee fraud), legal risk (arising from 
lawsuits from disgruntled clients), reputation risk, liquidity risk and operating 
leverage. 
These and other concerns eventually led to a new capital adequacy regime known as 
Basel 2, which is to take effect in 2007 (see, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2003), Jackson (2001, 2002)).  The stated objective of this new regime is 
to further enhance the security of the global banking system by introducing a three-
pillar system of regulation that covers operational risk in addition to credit and market 
risk: 
 Pillar 1 – sets minimum capital charges for credit, market and operational risks 
 Pillar 2  – involves supervision by national financial regulators 
 Pillar 3 – imposes market discipline via information disclosure  
The regulatory capital held under pillar 1 must be sufficient to cover expected losses 
as well as unexpected losses. Again banks can choose to use an internal or 
standardised model for measuring risk, but all banks must have a robust risk 
identification structure in place by 2007 that categorises loans in terms of default 
bands.  
As the regulatory capital required for each loan will depend on the probability of 
default (PD) of the borrower (determined by the bank) and the loss given default 
(LGD) (determined by the bank if it uses the advanced approach and set by the 
regulator if the bank uses the standardised approach). The expected loss to the bank is 
equal to the product of PD and LGP and the bank needs capital to cover at least its 
expected losses.  
However, there has been substantial criticism of the requirement to hold regulatory 
capital to cover expected losses, particularly by US banks which argue that expected 
losses are a cost of doing business that should be incorporated into transaction prices 
and met from loan-loss provisions rather than covered in regulatory capital (see 
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Global Risk Regulator2, September 2003). Some among the regulatory community 
have countered that it is hard to differentiate between expected and unexpected losses. 
It is also difficult to determine whether provisions are adequate to meet all expected 
losses, a necessary precondition for expected losses to be excluded from capital 
requirements.  
Pillars 2 and 3 have also been subject to criticisms by the banking community.  The 
banks are concerned that the discretion of national supervisors under Pillar 2 might be 
used to undermine the level playing field that banks world wide are supposed to play 
on. In respect of Pillar 3, the main concern is with the costs of providing the 
additional information required, measured against its usefulness to investors and 
regulators. 
In addition, many other concerns have also been raised. For example, Basel 2 retains 
many of the weaknesses of Basel 1 – its inflexibility, and so on – and an abiding 
concern is that the regulations attempt to stipulate what best practice should be in an 
environment where best practice is evolving rapidly. The regulatory notion of best 
practice inevitably lags behind the market’s perception of best practice, and regulatory 
requirements have often been criticised for hampering the development of ‘true’ best 
practice by imposing regulatory straightjackets on banks. A glaring example is the 
way in which regulatory requirements in effect lead to a situation where all banks that 
use the IRB approach to determine their regulatory capital are in effect being pushed 
to follow the same risk management strategies, i.e., to sell in a crisis, and such 
pressure is likely to exacerbate market instability in a crisis instead of reduce it.  
2.2 Life Assurance Companies 
In June 2004, the Financial Services Authority published the Integrated Prudential 
Sourcebook for Insurers (PSB)3 which introduced a new set of risk-based capital 
requirements for with-profits life assurers that came into effect on 1 January 2005.  
The aim is to treat a life assurer’s customers fairly through a combination of improved 
transparency, the holding of adequate capital for the firm’s business mix and 
compliance with the Principles and Practices of Financial Management (PPFM) that 
the firm has disclosed. To achieve this aim and also to ensure that life assurers are 
treated in a way comparable to banks, the FSA has adopted the same three-pillar 
approach to regulation as Basel 2. 
As noted earlier, pillar 1 of the three-pillar regime addresses regulatory capital and on 
this issue the PSB introduces a ‘twin peaks’ standard for a life assurer’s with-profits 
business that results in provisioning and capital requirements being more responsive 
to the ways in which bonus payments are made to policyholders. The first peak is 
necessary to ensure compliance with the EU Life Assurance Directive, known as 
Solvency 1. This peak specifies the long-term insurance capital requirement (LTICR), 
defined as mathematical reserves plus a required minimum risk capital margin.  
                                               
2
 http://www.globalriskregulator.com/ 
3
 This section draws heavily on this document, together with Consultation Paper 195 (Enhanced Capital 
Requirements and Individual Capital Assessments for Life Insurers) released in August 2003.  
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The mathematical reserves are the assets backing the life assurer’s liabilities, 
calculated as the actuarial value of its contractual and guaranteed benefits.  Net cash 
flows from current in-force business (benefits paid less premiums received) are 
forecast and discounted (using a discount rate that depends on the expected rate of 
return on fund assets) to give a net present value reserving requirement. Allowances, 
known as ‘margins for adverse deviation’, are made to account for potential forecast 
errors. For example, asset returns are reduced to allow for reinvestment risk and 
counterparty default risk, while the ‘net premium rule’ permits expected future 
premiums to be reduced by an amount that reflects the payment of future 
discretionary bonuses. 
The risk capital margin (RCM) is the additional capital that a firm needs in order to 
maintain cover of its with-profit liabilities, given a sequence of specified stress events 
in market risk (equity, interest rate, and property price risk), credit risk (default by 
issuers of the firm’s assets and non-payment by reinsurers), and persistency risk (the 
risk of a policyholder surrendering the policy early so that upfront marketing costs are 
not fully recouped). The specified stress events are: 
 Equity: 
o For UK equities a fall of at least 10%, or if greater, the lower of: 
 A percentage fall in the market value of equities which would 
produce an earnings yield of the FTSE Actuaries All Share 
Index equal to 4/3rds of the long-term gilt yield; and  
 25% less any percentage reduction between the current FTSE 
Actuaries All Share Index and its average over the last 90 days 
o Broadly equivalent test for overseas equities  
 Interest rates: The more onerous of a fall or rise in yields on all fixed interest 
securities by a percentage point amount equal to 20% of the long term gilt 
yield (or comparable foreign government bond yield for foreign bonds) 
 Real estate: A fall in real estate values of a minimum of 10% and a maximum 
of 20%; the required fall increases as the ratio of the current value of an 
appropriate real estate index to the average value of that index over the three 
preceding financial years increases. 
 Credit risk: 
o Rated investment grade corporate bonds: 
 Increase in corporate bond yield spreads over equivalent risk 
free rates from spreads prevailing at valuation date. Increase by 
differential between current average bond yield spread and 
specified maximum bond yield spread. Maximum bond yield 
spreads of 90-210 basis points above risk free rates, according 
to credit grade of bond assets. 
o Rated, non-investment grade corporate bonds: 
 Increase in corporate bond yield spreads over equivalent risk 
free rates from spreads prevailing at valuation date. Increase by 
differential between current average bond yield spread and 
specified maximum bond yield spread. Maximum bond yield 
spreads of 525-900 basis points above risk free rates, according 
to credit grade of bond assets. For the lowest rated bonds, not in 
default, a fixed capital charge of 10% of the market value of 
that bond. 
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o Non-rated corporate bonds: 
 Where the firm assesses the credit quality to be equivalent to 
that of a rated bond, according to the rating and the method for 
corporate bonds. In other cases, a fixed capital charge of 10% 
of market value of bond. 
o Commercial mortgages and other non-rated assets: 
 Where the firm assesses the credit quality to be equivalent to 
that of a rated bond, according to the rating and the method for 
corporate bonds. In other cases, a fixed capital charge of 10% 
of market value of the non-rated asset. 
o Reinsurance concentration: 
 For material reinsurance arrangements,  
• where the reinsurer is rated, according to the credit 
rating of the reinsurer, and the method for corporate 
bonds; 
• where the reinsurer is not rated, a fixed capital charge of 
10% of value of the reinsurance asset. 
 Intra-group reinsurance is excluded, where both insurer and 
reinsurer are regulated in a designated state. 
o Assets in default, that are specifically provisioned in accordance with 
accounting practice: 
 No credit stress required 
o Persistency: 
 Termination rates in each year of projection of 50% of the 
termination rates assumed in realistic liabilities. 
The RCM is the sum of the net losses for each of the above scenarios (i.e., in the cases 
where the assets fall by more than the fall in with-profit liabilities), and is required to 
be at least 4%. 
There is also a resilience capital requirement applied to the mathematical reserves. 
This test requires additional resilience capital to be set aside if stressed market 
conditions indicate that asset values will fall by more than the reduction in 
mathematical reserves. The modification is that the additional capital can come 
directly from shareholders’ capital and need no longer be included in the 
mathematical reserves which are held in the life fund itself. In addition, the LTICR is 
calculated with reference to mathematical reserves net of resilience capital. 
The second peak is based on a realistic calculation of with-profits liabilities by life 
assurers. The PSB permits firms to carry out such calculations using one of two 
methods: the asset share approach and the prospective or bonus reserve approach.  For 
the purposes of valuing contracts with guarantees and embedded options, the PSB 
permits stochastic valuation and option pricing models. If the second peak is higher 
than the first peak, additional capital (the with-profits insurance capital component, or 
WPICC) will be needed to cover expected discretionary bonus payments (such as 
annual increases in reversionary bonuses and the terminal bonus). The WPICC makes 
an allowance for adverse experience: the future values of realistic assets and liabilities 
might be respectively less or more than expected as a result of a firm’s exposure to 
market, credit and persistency risks.  
 9 
The FSA estimates that the required level of pillar 1 capital (the capital resources 
requirement, or CRR) is the same as would attract a Standard and Poors BBB rating. 
A BBB rated insurer ‘has good financial security characteristics, but is more likely to 
be affected by adverse business conditions than are higher rated insurers’. The FSA 
suggests that this equates to a 99.5% confidence level that the firm concerned will 
survive for a one-year period. 
The second or supervisory pillar is handled in the PSB by a framework of individual 
capital adequacy standards (ICAS). Each firm assesses the level of capital suitable for 
its own risk profile (the individual capital assessment, ICA) and this is then compared 
with the minimum capital requirements for with-profits business (established by the 
twin peaks standard) and the insurer’s other life business. 
The PSB provides general guidance on the risks to capital that life assurers should 
consider in relation to their individual capital needs. It also provides guidance on how 
the risks might be assessed by means of capital stress tests, scenario analyses, or other 
models (such as economic capital models).  
The FSA also offers individual capital guidance (ICG) in the light of a life assurer’s 
individual capital assessments. To do this the following information needs to be 
submitted to the FSA: 
Item Coverage 
Summary A summary of the financial position of 
the firm at the time the report is 
constructed and the risks to which the 
firm is subject to. 
Individual capital assessment (ICA) The firm's proposed ICA, expressed as a 
proportion of its 'pillar 1' capital 
resources requirement (CRR). 
Background Relevant historical development of the 
firm and any conclusions that can be 
drawn from that development which may 
have implications for the future of the 
firm. 
Current business The current business profile of the firm. 
The future The environment in which the firm 
expects to operate, and its projected 
business plans, projected financial 
position and future sources of capital. 
Capital analysis A detailed review of the capital adequacy 
of the firm. This analysis could include a 
commentary and opinion on the 
applicability of the CRR to the firm's own 
capital position and its appropriateness 
compared to its own capital assessment. 
It could involve an analysis of current 
capital levels and movements in solvency 
during the past years, future capital 
requirements and general outlook.  
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Risk assessment An identification of the major risks faced 
in each of the following categories: credit 
risk; market risk; insurance risk; 
operational risk and liquidity risk; and the 
extent to which the firm holds capital in 
response to each risk. 
Stress and scenario tests 
 
The quantitative results of stress and 
scenario tests carried out by the firm and 
the confidence level and key assumptions 
behind those analyses. 
Other risks Identification of any risks, for example 
systems and controls weaknesses, which 
in the firm's opinion are not adequately 
captured by the CRR. The firm's 
assessment of how it is responding to 
those risks, and if through holding 
capital, the amount. 
Capital models If a more sophisticated modelling 
approach is used by the firm, we would 
expect a statement of the confidence level 
and other parameters that have been used 
in the model. 
Source: FSA CP195, p 48, 2003  
Given this information, the FSA will confirm either that the firm’s capital assessment 
is adequate or that a higher level of capital is required in the light of the FSA’s 
judgement that the firm’s business risks are greater than the firm has itself assessed. 
The FSA wishes to be confident that if the projected adverse financial situations 
materialise, then firms will still be able to pay their liabilities in full when they fall 
due. This requires that assets are valued at their liquidation value under the relevant 
scenarios and that liabilities are given a realistic value for their due date. The 
overarching aim is to ensure that a firm’s customers are ‘treated fairly’. This means 
that a firm must have sufficient resources to ensure that its customers’ ‘reasonable 
expectations’ concerning terminal bonuses are fulfilled.   
The PSB also takes account of the EU’s ‘Solvency 1’ Life Directive in the following 
ways. The minimum capital requirement for life assurers is set at Euro 3 million and 
this will be updated in line with EU consumer price inflation. The capital resource 
requirement (or required margin of solvency) must be met at all times rather than just 
at the date of the last balance sheet. It can be met with ordinary shares without limit 
and with cumulative preference shares, subordinated debt and unpaid share capital up 
to specified limits (and in the last case with approval):  
Tier of Capital Limit 
Tier 1 
 
 
Core tier 1 Unlimited but at least 50% of total tier 1 
Ordinary shares  
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Reserves  
Non-ordinary shares  
Innovative tier 1 15% of total tier 1 
Capital instruments  
Innovative instruments  
Implicit items  Waiver required 
Tier 2 100% of total tier 1 
 
Upper tier 2  
Perpetual cumulative preference shares  
Perpetual subordinated debt  
Lower tier 2 25% of total capital resources 
Long term subordinated debt  
Other capital Waiver required 
Unpaid share capital  
Source: FSA CP195, p 62  
Note: Characteristics of innovative instruments (FSA CP195, p 63, 2003): Treated as 
a liability in financial statements; coupon payments may be deferred with any 
deferred coupons payable only in shares; no specified redemption date but terms may 
include an issuer call which may coincide with an increase in the coupon; normally 
ranks pari passu with preference shares; loss absorbency usually achieved through 
conversion into shares at a predetermined trigger event. 
Currently future profits can be used to offset the capital requirement. Implicit items 
for future profits are restricted to 2/3rds of the firm’s LTICR (or to the level of the 
LTICR minus EUR 3 million, if less). By 2007 implicit items for future profits must 
be restricted to 25% of the lesser of the LTICR and its total (eligible) capital 
resources; and from 31 December 2009 they will no longer be allowed.  Firms will be 
required to submit an actuarial report substantiating the emergence of anticipated 
profits in future periods. 
The PSB also changes the way in which capital resources are reported. The traditional 
approach measures the total of admissible assets less foreseeable liabilities. The new 
approach lists the components of capital. Both calculations give the same result as 
shown in the following table (drawn from FSA CP195: Table 2.2.10 G, Annex 6, 
2003): 
Liabilities  Assets  
Borrowing 100 Admissible assets 350 
Ordinary shares 200 Intangible assets 100 
Reserves 100 Other inadmissible 
assets 
100 
Perpetual 
subordinated debt 
150   
Total 550 Total 550 
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Traditional calculation of capital resources: Eligible assets less foreseeable 
liabilities 
  
Total assets 550 
Less Intangible assets 100 
Less Inadmissible assets 100 
Less Liabilities (borrowing) 100 
Capital resources 250 
 
New calculation of capital resources: Components of Capital 
  
Ordinary shares 200 
Reserves 100 
Perpetual subordinated debt 150 
Less Intangible assets 100 
Less Inadmissible assets 100 
Capital resources  250 
This new approach is the same as that used by banks, building societies and 
investment firms. 
For its part, the EU is introducing a ‘Solvency 2’ Life Directive in 2007 which will 
bring the regulation of life assurers even closer to the three-pillar Basel 2 framework 
of capital charges, supervisory review and information disclosure.4  
So although there are legitimate criticisms of the regulatory regimes that have been 
established for both banks and life assurers, what is nevertheless clear is the extremely 
detailed exercises these institutions need to perform to determine the regulatory 
capital they need to (hopefully) remain solvent with a high degree of probability. 
 
 
                                               
4
 There are also important accounting issues to consider. In 2005, the International Accounting 
Standards Board introduced ‘fair value’ international accounting standards. However, insurers are 
required to use the fair value standard for assets from 2005 but the fair value standard for liabilities 
(which replaces the book value measure) is to be used from 2007. The FSA believes that fair-value 
accounting is a necessary concomitant of risk-based solvency regulations: in order to ensure that firms 
match their capital more accurately to the risks they face, they need to measure both their assets and 
liabilities in a fair and transparent manner, in contrast with the opaque valuation methods that were 
commonly used. Needless to say, there has been intensive debate on the impact of ‘fair value’ 
accounting, and the main argument against is the concern that it might lead to excessive spurious 
earnings volatility.  
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3  The Financial Regulation of Pension Funds: Why is it different? 
The financial regulation of UK pension funds differs from that of banks life assurers 
in a number of key respects. First, they are not regulated by the FSA at all: they are 
regulated by the Pensions Regulator (TPR) which is not even based in the same 
building as the FSA but in a different city. Second, pension funds do not have any 
formal capital requirements: instead they operate on a prudent person principle which 
gives pension fund managers much greater discretion than their counterparts in other 
financial institutions. This raises the question of why the regulatory system does not 
treat pension funds in the same way as other financial institutions, including  
institutions that also make long-term investments, such as life assurers.  
Defined benefit pension schemes share many of the characteristics of the with-profit 
policies sold by life assurers. Both aim to deliver a pre-determined benefit (a fixed 
minimum return in the one case, a fixed proportion of final salary in the other), 
despite investing in assets whose returns can be highly volatile. It is therefore curious 
that whilst the financial regulation of insurance companies is moving closer to that of 
banks, the financial regulation of pension funds remains very different to either.  
The third key difference between banks, life assurers and pension funds is that the 
first two are subject to a solvency standard whereas the latter is subject to a funding 
standard. A solvency standard ensures that assets exceed liabilities. A funding 
standard involves setting a smooth path for contributions that is meant to enable the 
fund to pay the promised benefits over the long run.5 A funding standard is much 
weaker than a solvency standard. For example, a pension fund can be fully funded but 
still be unable to pay its liabilities in full if the sponsor becomes insolvent. This means 
that a fully funded scheme might still depend on future sponsor contributions to make 
good any deficit. 
The first attempt at the financial regulation of pension funds was the Minimum 
Funding Requirement (MFR) introduced by the 1995 Pensions Act. The MFR (which 
came into effect on 6 April 1997) established a minimum level of funding for a 
defined benefit (DB) pension scheme (or for a defined contribution pension scheme 
which also provides salary-related benefits) and an associated schedule of 
contributions necessary to meet this minimum level of funding. The pension scheme’s 
trustees were responsible for ensuring that this schedule was delivered.  The MFR 
could be satisfied either by the minimum level of funding being met immediately or 
by having a schedule of contributions in place that would meet the minimum funding 
level within a specified time limit (initially a maximum of 5 years, subsequently 
extended to 10 years).   
                                               
5
 Underlying regulatory thinking here is the ‘prudent person’ principle. To quote paragraph (31) of the 
Preamble to the new European Union Pension Fund Directive (2003):  
“Institutions are very long-term investors. Redemption of the assets held by these institutions cannot, in 
general, be made for any purpose other than providing retirement benefits.  Furthermore, in order to 
protect adequately the rights of members and beneficiaries, institutions should be able to opt for an 
asset allocation that suits the precise nature and duration of their liabilities.  These aspects call for 
efficient supervision and an approach towards investment rules allowing institutions sufficient 
flexibility to decide on the most secure and efficient investment policy and obliging them to act 
prudently.  Compliance with the ‘prudent person rule’ therefore requires an investment policy geared to 
the membership structure of the individual institution for occupational retirement provision.” 
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A pension scheme was defined to have a ‘deficiency’ when it has insufficient assets to 
meet its liabilities. The schedule of contributions needed to make good any deficiency 
must be agreed between the trustees and sponsor. A ‘serious deficiency’ occurs when 
the assets are valued at less than 90% of the value of the liabilities. To reduce such a 
deficiency, the assets had to be increased to at least 90% of the liabilities, valued on 
the basis set out under the MFR rules within one year (later extended to three years).  
This outcome could be achieved either through a cash payment to the fund by the 
sponsor or by the sponsor giving a financial guarantee to bring the scheme’s assets up 
to at least 90% of the liabilities in the event that the sponsor becomes insolvent and 
contributions to the fund must continue to be paid. If neither of these solutions was 
feasible, the trustees had to inform the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority 
(OPRA)6 within 14 days and scheme members within one month.  
If the deficiency was less serious and assets were worth between 90% and 100% of 
liabilities, then the assets had to be increased to 100% of the liabilities by the end of 
the period covered by the schedule of contributions.  Contributions might be increased 
to achieve this outcome, and any such increased contributions could be spread evenly 
throughout the period covered by the schedule.  It was also permissible for larger 
contributions to be paid early on in the period (this is called ‘frontloading’), but the 
‘backloading’ of contributions towards the end of the period was not permitted.  
Following each MFR valuation, the trustees had to establish a schedule of 
contributions within twelve weeks. Each schedule covered a five-year period and 
might need to be revised during this period to ensure that the MFR continued to be 
met. The schedule showed the contribution rates and due dates for all the 
contributions to be paid: 
 by (or on behalf of) all active members (excluding additional voluntary 
contributions) 
 by (or on behalf of) each sponsoring employer taking part in the scheme 
 by the sponsoring employer to rectify a serious shortfall in funding.  
Even with this schedule of contributions, it was not necessarily the case that the whole 
of a scheme’s liabilities could be met in full if the scheme were to be wound up 
immediately.  The MFR did not guarantee absolute security for pensions because 
(unlike Basel 2 and Solvency 2), the MFR was a funding standard and not a solvency 
standard.7 As the Chairman of the Pensions Board of the Faculty and Institute of 
Actuaries (FIA), Mike Pomery, stated at the 2000 NAPF annual conference, the MFR 
gave scheme members only a ‘reasonable expectation’ that they would get their full 
pension, not ‘absolute security’.  
In any case, the FIA estimated that full funding for UK pension funds (i.e., the full 
cost of a buy-out with insurance companies) would cost an additional £100bn on top 
of assets valued at £830bn in 2000 (Faculty and Institute of Actuaries (2000)). There 
were a number of reasons for this: 
                                               
6
  The predecessor to TPR between 1997 and 2005. 
7
 The Goode Report (1993), which led to the 1995 Pensions Act that established the MFR, 
recommended that pension funds should be subject to a solvency standard, but this recommendation 
was watered down into a much weaker funding standard by the time the Act was passed. 
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 the claims of retired members were met first 
 the insurance companies that provided both immediate and deferred pension 
annuities for members when a sponsoring company was wound up were likely 
to use lighter mortality assumptions than allowed for in the MFR regulations 
and hence offered lower annuities for a given purchase price 
 falling long-term interest rates since 1990 which raised the present value of 
scheme liabilities; even though the assets held by DB schemes, mainly 
equities, had traditionally delivered very high returns, they still failed to keep 
up with the growth in scheme liabilities since the introduction of the MFR in 
1997. 
 liabilities were valued using the current unit method with LPI revaluation, and 
so did not take into account future earnings growth. 
As many as one in six pension funds in 2000 were either at, or below, the MFR 
borderline of 90% funding. The weakness of the MFR standard was exposed in 2000 
by the case of Blagden, a chemicals company whose pension fund fully satisfied the 
MFR, but which went into insolvency with funds sufficient only to meet two-thirds of 
its obligations to active members.  
The resulting public debate led to a Treasury-sponsored review of institutional 
investment chaired by Paul Myners, chief executive of Gartmore. The Myners Report 
was published in March 2001 and its recommendations were immediately accepted in 
full by the Government (Myners (2001)). Myners called for a new approach to 
institutional investment, identified a series of current distortions to effective decision-
making, and suggested ways of tackling these distortions.  
One of the key features of the report was its proposal to replace the MFR with a long-
term scheme-specific funding standard in the context of a strong regime of 
transparency and disclosure. The report also proposed a set of additional measures to 
strengthen protection: 
 a recovery plan for returning schemes to full funding 
 a statutory duty of care on the scheme actuary 
 stricter conditions on the voluntary wind-up of a scheme where the employer 
remains solvent (e.g., the liabilities would have to include the actual cost of 
winding up the scheme and the actual cost of buying annuities to secure 
pensions in payment), and 
 an extension of the fraud compensation scheme: the level of compensation for 
fraud would be increased to cover not simply the MFR liabilities as at present, 
but the full cost of securing members’ accrued benefits (or the amount of the 
loss from fraud, whichever is the lesser). 
As the Government noted, ‘These proposals will provide protection for members of 
all defined benefit schemes and will encourage an intelligent and thought-through 
approach to planning investment and contributions policy. They do not distort 
investment as the MFR does, because they do not involve the valuation of liabilities 
using statutory reference assets which create artificial incentives for schemes to invest 
in those assets. Employers that wish to go on offering defined benefit schemes will 
find it easier to do so under these proposals. At the same time, the proposals will 
make it more difficult for those that wish to walk away from the pension promises 
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that they have made’.  
On 11 June 2003, the Government announced that any solvent company which wound 
up its DB pension scheme had to do so, not on an MFR basis, but on a full buy-out 
basis with a life assurer (i.e., the fund had to have sufficient assets to buy immediate 
annuities for the scheme’s pensioners and deferred annuities for active and deferred 
members).  
Following this, the 2004 Pensions Act introduced the requirement for a scheme-
specific funding standard8  to replace the MFR. This requires scheme trustees to:  
 prepare a Statement of Funding Principles9 specific to the circumstances of 
each scheme, setting out how the Statutory Funding Objective (SFO)10 will be 
met  
 obtain periodic actuarial valuations and actuarial reports  
 prepare a schedule of contributions  
 implement a recovery plan where the SFO is not met. 
Trustees are also required to prepare a transparency statement that reports: 
 the current value of its assets and in what asset classes they are invested 
 the assumptions used to determine its liabilities 
 planned future contributions 
 its planned asset allocation for the following year or years 
 the assumed returns and assumed volatilities of those returns for each asset 
class sufficient to meet the liabilities 
 a justification by the trustees of the reasonableness of both their asset 
allocation and the investment returns assumed in the light of the circumstances 
of the fund and of the sponsor, and  
 an explanation of the implications of the volatility of the investment values for 
possible underfunding, and a justification by trustees of why this level of 
volatility is judged to be acceptable. 
                                               
8
 Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Funding) Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/3377). 
9
 The Statement of Funding Principles sets out trustee policy for meeting the Statutory Funding 
Objective and should include: 
 funding objectives and the trustees' policy for meeting it 
 the scheme's investment policy 
 whether the Regulator has given any direction in relation to the scheme 
 the calculation basis for measuring assets and technical provisions 
 how often actuarial valuations will be obtained 
 how cash equivalent transfer values will be calculated.  
10
 The Statutory Funding Objective states that the scheme must have sufficient and appropriate assets 
to cover its technical provisions. The technical provisions are an estimate, made using actuarial 
principles, of the assets needed at any particular time to make provisions for the benefits that have 
already accrued under the scheme, including pensions in payment, benefits payable to the survivors of 
former members and those benefits accrued by other members which will be payable in the future. The 
technical provisions are calculated using an accrual benefits funding method and assumptions all 
chosen by the trustees, after taking the actuary’s advice and obtaining the employer’s agreement 
(Pensions Act 2004). 
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The scheme-specific funding standard must reflect the specific liabilities of the 
scheme.  This suggests that the pension fund should be looking to invest in assets that 
match as closely as possible the liabilities of the scheme in terms of key features of 
the liabilities, such as the way that they change over time in response to earnings 
growth, changing interest rates and demographic factors, such as the maturity 
structure of the liabilities of the scheme.  
4 Lessons from Other Government-Sponsored Insurance Schemes  
4.1 Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is a UK Government-
sponsored insurance scheme covering companies authorised by the FSA. It came into 
operation on 1 December 2001.11 The FSCS is independent of the FSA and provides 
compensation to consumers if an authorised company becomes insolvent and is not 
able to pay its liabilities.  
The FSCS provides for three kinds of compensation, with different rules and limits: 
 Deposit Claims include deposits with banks, building societies and credit 
unions.  
 Insurance Claims include: 
o compulsory insurance (such as third party motor insurance)  
o non-compulsory insurance (such as home insurance)  
o long-term insurance (such as pension plans and life assurance).  
 Investment Claims include claims relating to bad investment advice or poor 
investment management, or where a firm has gone out of business and cannot 
return your investments or money.  
The compensation limits for the FSCS are: deposits £31,700 (100% of £2,000 and 
90% of £33,000); long–term insurance at least 90% of the value of the policyholder’s 
guaranteed fund at the date of default; general insurance, compulsory, 100% of valid 
claim/unexpired premiums, non compulsory, 100% of the first £2,000 of valid 
claim/unexpired premiums and 90% of the remainder of the claim; investments 
£48,000 (100% of £30,000 and 90% of next £20,000). 
The FSCS is funded by levies on the industry on a pay-as-you-go basis. There are two 
types of levy: a management expenses levy and a compensation costs levy. The 
former is determined annually in advance and covers ‘base costs’ (payable by all 
                                               
11
 The FSCS replaced eight existing schemes each of which provided compensation if a firm collapsed 
owing money to depositors, policyholders or investors: the Deposit Protection Scheme, the Building 
Society Investor Protection Scheme, the Policyholders Protection Scheme, the Friendly Societies 
Protection Scheme, the Investors Compensation Scheme, the Section 43 Scheme (which covers 
business transacted with listed money-market institutions), the Personal Investment Authority 
indemnity scheme, and the arrangement between the Association of British Insurers and the Investor 
Compensation Scheme Ltd for paying compensation to widows, widowers and dependants of deceased 
persons.  
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firms) and the ‘specific costs’ associated with paying compensation which depends on 
the number of claims and types of default.  
The compensation costs levy is also determined in advance on the basis of 
‘anticipated compensation costs for defaults expected to be declared in the 12 month 
period following the date of the levy’. These include ‘the costs incurred in paying 
compensation, securing continuity of long-term insurance and safeguarding eligible 
claimants when insurers are in financial difficulties’ (Financial Services Authority 
(2001)). 
The FSCS is supported by the regulatory frameworks facing the institutions it covers. 
These determine the minimum regulatory capital needed to cover specified losses. In 
principle, these enable the probability of loss and expected loss to be quantified and 
hence enable the insurance premium for the FSCS to be set on the basis of standard 
insurance principles. The FSCS is therefore likely to be an effective insurance scheme 
whose solvency is assured by the adequacy of its premium income. 
4.2 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)  
We now turn to the United States and, in particular, to the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Company. This is particularly relevant to us here as the PBGC is the model on which 
the Pension Protection Fund is based.12   
The PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to 
encourage continuation and maintenance of DB pension plans in the US, provide 
timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits, and keep pension insurance 
premiums at a minimum. The PBGC covers 44 million workers in 30,000 DB plans. It 
pays monthly retirement benefits to 683,000 retirees in 3,600 pension plans that have 
ended and is responsible for the current and future pensions of about 1.3 million 
people. For plans ended in 2006, workers who retire at age 65 can receive up to 
$47,659 a year.  
The PBGC’s premium revenue was $1.5 billion in 2005. All single-employer pension 
plans pay a basic flat-rate premium of $19 per participant per year. Underfunded 
pension plans pay an additional variable-rate charge of $9 per $l,000 (i.e., 0.9%) of 
unfunded vested benefits. The premium for smaller multiemployer program is $2.60 
per participant per year. The PBGC paid nearly $3.7 billion in benefits in 2005. The 
sense among experts in the field is that these premiums are worryingly low in 
comparison with the potential payouts expected of the PBGC: in 2005, the PBGC had 
a deficit of liabilities over assets of $23 billion. 
An interesting aspect of the PBGC is how the premium it charges has increased since 
1974:  
 1974: flat-rate of $1 per participant  
 1978: flat-rate of $2.60 per participant 
 1986: flat-rate of $8.50 per participant 
 1988: 
                                               
12
 See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation website http://www.pbgc.gov/. 
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o basic premium raised to $16 
o additional variable-rate premium was imposed on underfunded 
plans of $6 per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits up to a 
maximum of $34 per participant  
 1991: 
o basic premium raised to $19 
o additional variable-rate premium raised to $9 per $1,000 of 
unfunded vested benefits up to a maximum of $53 per participant 
 1994: 
o basic premium stays at $19 
o variable-rate premiums increased for plans that pose greatest risk 
by phasing out maximum limit on premiums for underfunded plans 
 1996: maximum variable-rate premium completely eliminated  
 2006: basic premium raised to $30 
Although the premium is exposure-related (i.e., it is related to the level of the claim in 
the event of insolvency), the premium is not explicitly risk-related (i.e., so it is not 
higher for sponsors more likely to become insolvent). The premium is also not related 
to the probability of a claim being made. This means that, contrary to standard 
insurance principles, financially weak sponsors with underfunded schemes are not 
charged the full risk-adjusted premium. This is of course a major weakness. 
There are three ways in which a pension plan can be taken over by the PBGC. 
The first is ‘distress termination’. A company in financial distress might voluntarily 
terminate a pension plan if: a petition has been filed seeking reorganization in 
bankruptcy, it has been demonstrated that the sponsor or affiliate cannot continue in 
business unless the plan is terminated, or it has been demonstrated that costs of 
providing pension coverage have become unreasonably burdensome solely as result of 
the decline in number of employees covered by the plan. 
The second is ‘involuntary termination’. The PBGC may terminate a pension plan if: 
the plan has not met minimum funding requirements; the plan cannot pay current 
benefits when due; a lump sum payment has been made to a participant who is a 
substantial owner of the sponsoring company; or the loss to the PBGC is expected to 
increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated. 
The third is ‘standard termination’.  A plan may terminate if the plan assets are 
insufficient to satisfy all plan benefits e.g., through the purchase of annuities with an 
insurer. There were 166,522 standard terminations between 1974 and 2005. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the PBGC has experienced a number of cases in which 
companies have deliberately underfunded their pension plan in advance of their own 
bankruptcy. It has sought to protect itself against such behaviour through a number of 
defences.  
One of these defences is an Early Warning Program. The PBGC monitors certain 
companies which are financially distressed or have underfunded DB plans to try to 
prevent losses before they occur, rather than waiting to pick up the pieces afterwards. 
The PBGC will then contact a company if: (1) the company has a below-investment-
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grade bond rating and sponsors a pension plan with a current liability of over $25m or 
(2) the company (regardless of its bond rating) sponsors a pension plan that has a 
current liability over $25m and that plan has an unfunded current liability over $5m. It 
is particularly concerned about transactions that substantially weaken the financial 
support for a pension plan such as the breakup of a controlled group, the transfer of 
significantly underfunded pension liabilities in connection with the sale of a business, 
or a leveraged buyout.   
Once the PBGC has identified a potential transaction that could jeopardize the 
pension insurance program, it meets with corporate representatives to negotiate 
additional contributions or security. It will work with the company to find a settlement 
appropriate to financial feasibility of company. However, in the event of the company 
becoming insolvent and the PBGC taking over the plan liabilities, the PBGC can 
claim up to 30% of the company’s net worth to cover a deficiency in the plan.  
It is, of course, open to question whether such measures really give the PBGC 
sufficient protection to survive: Figure 1 shows how rapidly claims against the PBGC 
have built up over the last few years. However, there is no denying that the PBGC 
does seek to identify potential problems in advance and that it has developed 
specialized tools – including specialised technology, databases, financial expertise, 
co-ordination with other regulatory and governmental bodies, etc. – to help it operate.   
 
             
Fig 1 Claims on the PBGC 1975 – 2005 (single employer plans) ($bn) 
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So we have mixed lessons for the PPF in respect of the FSCS and PBGC. The former 
covers companies subject to a rigorous solvency standard and hence has a good 
chance of being able to meet claims if any of these companies does become insolvent. 
The latter currently has liabilities way in excess of its assets. We now turn to examine 
the risks faced by the PPF itself. 
5 The Financial Risks facing the PPF 
As we mentioned above, pension schemes in the UK have traditionally operated on a 
prudent person principle and made promises rather than guarantees. This is the 
principal reason why they have not faced formal capital requirements, in contrast 
with, say, life assurers which do offer contractual guarantees. However, the 
establishment of the the PPF is intended to mark a shift from promises to guarantees. 
Speaking at the Labour Party annual conference on 1 October 2003, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Gordon Brown said the Government would ‘legislate for a new 
statutory pension protection fund. In future every worker contributing to a pension 
will have their pension protected and be guaranteed their pension rights’. If we take 
Mr. Brown at his word, this means that a promise made by a scheme sponsor is 
ultimately guaranteed by the PPF.  
This will result in the PPF being subject to three key risks which we now examine. 
5.1 Moral hazard 
The first of these is moral hazard. This is one of the classic risks facing all insurance 
providers: people become more careless once they are insured and also have an 
incentive to play ‘games’ against the insurer. The PPF provides scheme sponsors with 
an incentive to underfund their schemes and invest in assets with higher expected 
returns and risks (Utgoff (1993)). This is because the value of the PPF guarantee is 
greatest for ‘those schemes where the sponsor is financially weak, the pension scheme 
is poorly funded, the equity exposure is high and contributions are low’ (McCarthy 
and Neuberger (2005)). If the assets perform well, the deficit will be reduced, but if 
the assets perform badly and the scheme becomes insolvent, the PPF will take over 
the pension liabilities. The PPF can respond by increasing the risk-based premium for 
an underfunded scheme, but this might not solve the problem and might actually make 
matters worse for a sponsoring company which is already in financial difficulty. For 
an employer near to insolvency, there is a pronounced trade-off between pensions and 
jobs.13 
Furthermore, the very existence of the PPF provides an incentive for financially weak 
companies to increase pension benefits rather than wage increases: after all, the latter 
have to be paid immediately, while the former might eventually be paid by the PPF. 
Other ‘games’ the PPF should be wary of are the early retirement of senior directors 
of a company taking substantial pension benefits with them, the sale of a subsidiary 
with an underfunded pension scheme to a financially weak buyer, and pressure on the 
scheme actuary to change the actuarial assumptions in a way that lowers the reported 
                                               
13
 Certainly for risk-based premiums to have the desired effect of increasing the funding level, the 
premium must be greater than the cost to the sponsor of borrowing funds to reduce the deficit.  
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deficit and reduces employer contributions (see also Gebhardtsbauer and Turner 
(2004)). 
And, indeed, the Government should protect itself against moral hazard on the part of 
the PPF itself. The PPF too has an incentive to take increased asset risk, since it can 
rely on future premiums and an implicit (albeit denied) Government underwrite. 
Whatever the Government might say about the PPF fending for itself, the fact is that 
the Government would be reluctant to allow the PPF to go bust, and this reluctance 
exposes the Government to the danger of moral hazard by the PPF. 
5.2 Adverse selection: Bad drives out good 
Another classic risk that the PPF is exposed to is adverse selection: only those most 
likely to claim take out insurance. As with all forms of insurance, strong schemes 
subsidise weak schemes. The PPF is exposed to this risk because the levies charged 
by the PPF provide a strong incentive for financially strong employers to close down 
their defined benefit schemes, leaving only the schemes of financially weak sponsors 
participating in the PPF. Although participation is mandatory if an employer has a DB 
scheme, there is no requirement for an employer to operate a DB scheme in the first 
place. For the last ten years, firms have been switching away from DB schemes 
towards DC schemes, although on 11 June 2003, the Government announced that 
solvent companies could not walk away from their DB obligations accrued before this 
date unless they were fully bought out by an insurance company by means of current 
and deferred annuities. It is also possible that some strong firms will seek to avoid the 
PPF level, and there is anecdotal evidence that some companies are considering 
taking their businesses offshore for just this reason. 
5.3 Systemic risk 
Insurance works best where the risks covered by the insurer are specific or 
idiosyncratic risks, i.e., risks that are uncorrelated across claimants. This is because 
specific risks can be pooled and the insurance book is diversified. Insurance works 
less well if the risks assumed are systemic: in such cases there is little benefit from 
diversification. 
Unfortunately, there are good reasons to think that some of the risks faced by the PPF 
are indeed systematic. For example, McCarthy and Neuberger (2005) make the point 
that the PPF faces systemic risk because insolvencies are cyclical. Claims arise when 
firms become insolvent and the claim size depends on the level of under-funding. 
Since pension funds have a heavy equity exposure, under-funding is therefore worst 
after sharp falls in stock markets and this is just when corporate insolvencies are 
likely to peak. 
McCarthy and Neuberger support this argument using the results of an illustrative 
simulation model. They assume for the sake of argument that pension funds invest 
two-thirds of their assets in equities, have a 10-year deficit amortisation period, 
guarantee 100% of their liabilities and set premiums equal to the corresponding 
average annual breakeven claim rate of 0.3% of liabilities. Given these assumptions, 
their model suggests that, over 30 years, it is likely that there will be one year in 
which the claim rate is 1.2% and that it is plausibly possible that claims could equal 
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10% of liabilities. In other words, even if one accepts that claims will be low on 
average, the PPF is likely to experience years when the claims will be very high when 
prolonged weakness in equity markets coincides with widespread corporate 
insolvencies. 
They go on to argue that it will be hard for the PPF to build reserves to cover claims 
of this size and therefore the PPF will need to raise premiums sharply after a 
prolonged market downturn, i.e., at the very time when companies will be financially 
stretched. In such a situation, there is a very real danger that the PPF could become 
insolvent.14  
6 Dealing with these Risks 
Naturally, the PPF has a strong incentive to design the insurance it provides to protect 
itself against these problems as best it can. Were the PPF a standard insurer, it might 
consider any of the following possible defences (drawing lessons where possible from 
the earlier sections of the paper): 
 the PPF could be permitted to convert its claim against the sponsoring 
company from a debt claim to an equity claim 
 having a maximum payout following a successful claim (i.e., co-insurance) 
 permitting risk-based insurance premiums linked to the level of plan 
underfunding  
 having  a funding standard for schemes that will limit risk taking by the 
sponsoring company 
 close supervision and threatening the public exposure of companies that are 
underfunding their schemes. 
We will examine whether these defences are likely to be successful in the case of the 
PPF. 
6.1 An equity claim against the sponsoring company  
This defence will not, in general, work for the PPF as the sponsoring company which 
puts its pension scheme into the PPF will itself be insolvent.15 
6.2 A maximum payout  
Limiting the payout to a maximum proportion of the liabilities is generally a good 
way of reducing moral hazard. Unfortunately, this defence cannot be applied by the 
PPF because the 2004 Pensions Act specifies that the size of the payout should be 
independent of the assets in the fund.  
                                               
14
 There is in fact a fourth risk that the PPF is also subjected to: political risk. For example, financially 
weak companies could exert pressure on the politicians in the constituencies where they are located to 
press for a reduction in the premiums that they face. There is also a risk that the Government limits 
contributions into the pension scheme in good economic times in order to limit its tax loss and in doing 
so limits the surplus that provides a cushion against later falls in equity markets. In fact, the 1986 
Finance Act did precisely this and limited pension scheme surpluses to 5% of liabilities. 
15
 However, in 2005, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) did buy 10% of insurance broker Heath 
Lambert in return for bailing out its pension scheme. 
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However, other restrictions might help in certain circumstances. For example, the PPF 
might refuse to cover pension benefit withdrawals (especially by senior directors) or 
benefit increases made in a specified period (such as three years) prior to a scheme’s 
insolvency. Similarly, the PPF might refuse to permit the sale of a subsidiary with an 
underfunded pension scheme to a financially weak buyer without a guarantee from the 
parent company.16 
6.3 Risk-based premiums linked to the level of underfunding 
Risk-based premiums are often suggested as a good way of dealing with moral 
hazard, but there are two problems with risk-based premiums in this case. 
The first deals with assessing the correct level of default risk and hence premiums. 
Bodie (1996) shows that the default risk facing the PPF depends on the financial 
strength of the sponsoring company, the level of underfunding of the scheme, and the 
extent of mismatch between the scheme assets and liabilities. The problem is that the 
last two factors depend on the sponsor’s contribution policy and the scheme’s 
investment strategy, respectively. So, for example, an underfunded scheme might 
follow an aggressive equity-based investment strategy, hoping to rely on the equity 
risk premium to compensate for its inadequate contributions. 
More light can be shed on these issues by thinking of the insurance provided by the 
PBGC or PPF as a put option on the scheme’s assets (see, e.g., Sharpe (1976), 
Treynor (1977), Langetieg et al (1982), Marcus (1987) and Lewis and Pennacchi 
(1999a,b)). Vanderhei (1990) found that the insurance premiums charged by the 
PBGC significantly underestimated the true level of risk assumed by the PBGC, 
despite the fact that the basic premium had increased 30-fold since the PBGC was 
established. More specifically, Vanderhei estimated the size of the insurance 
premiums the PBGC needed to charge to cover its costs. As mentioned above, in 
order to be actuarially fair, this must equal the expected loss to the PBGC which, in 
turn, is equal to the product of the probability of default (PD) of a pension scheme and 
the loss given default (LGD). Using data supplied by the PBGC, Vanderhei calculated 
the breakeven insurance premium for the PBGC using its own formula of a fixed 
premium per member and a variable premium per $1,000 of underfunding. He found 
that the PBGC was undercharging on average (by a factor of 4.5), but also imposed 
significant cross-subsidies from strong to weak firms, thus worsening the problem of 
adverse selection.  
The second problem is whether risk-adjusted premiums will have the desired effect of 
reducing risk-taking. Both McCarthy and Neuberger (2005) and Gebhardtsbauer and 
Turner (2204) give persuasive arguments to doubt that risk-based premiums would 
help to alleviate the PPF’s moral hazard problems. They argue that such premiums 
would simply drive already weak schemes and companies to insolvency: this is 
because for companies already close to insolvency, the correct premium would be 
                                               
16
 This is precisely what Norwegian shipping group Aker Kvaerner did in the case of its UK subsidiary. 
Just days before the new pension regulatory regime came into force in April 2005, the subsidiary was 
sold to its management for £1, thereby breaking the link between a profitable parent and a loss-making 
subsidiary. At the time, the subsidiary had a pension scheme deficit of £245m on liabilities of £1.2bn. 
The Pension Regulator eventually pressurised Kvaerner into paying £101m into the fund before 2012, 
but this was still not enough to cover the full deficit. 
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close to the level of underfunding. And attempts to get more solvent schemes to cross-
subsidise the weak schemes would exacerbate adverse selection and push the stronger 
schemes away from DB provision. Any attempt to make premiums risk-related could 
therefore easily backfire and increase the likelihood of the severe loss outcomes that 
the PPF is trying to avoid. 
6.4 A funding standard for schemes 
There is also the possibility that moral hazard could be reduced by introducing tighter 
funding requirements. The 2004 Pensions Act recognised this possibility and 
introduced a scheme-specific funding standard (not a common (i.e., one size fits all) 
funding standard). 
 
The Pensions Regulator (2006, para 2.4) announced it would take the following 
approach to implementing the requirements of the Act:  
 to promote, through its code of practice and other forms of guidance and 
communication, good understanding by trustees, employers and their advisers 
of the matters they should consider when they agree their scheme’s Statutory 
Funding Objective and any recovery plan needed to raise funding to that 
level;  
 to intervene in those schemes where the funding objective is imprudent or the 
recovery plan is inappropriate, in order to protect members’ benefits and/or 
reduce risks to the PPF; and 
 to be transparent with trustees, employers and their advisers about the ways in 
which it intend to focus its resources on schemes that are likely to pose the 
greatest risk. 
 
In doing this, it said it would use the following guiding principles (para 2.5): 
 
 protect members – it would support trustees and employers working to 
maximise the protection of the benefits that the employer promised to pay and 
that members are expecting; 
 be scheme specific – it is not its role, nor is it consistent with Government 
policy, to set a funding standard, because each scheme needs to take account 
of its particular circumstances; 
 be risk-based – regulatory intervention should be focused on the schemes that 
pose the greatest risk to members’ benefits and the PPF. While it is never 
possible to eliminate all risk, those in a position to do so should seek to 
mitigate those risks wherever it is reasonable to do so; 
 be proportionate – trustees should aim to correct any shortfall as quickly as 
the employer can reasonably afford. The Pensions Regulator intends to 
distinguish between those schemes where rapid elimination of the shortfall 
would have a serious adverse impact on the employer’s viability and those 
where employers could potentially afford to pay off the shortfall more 
quickly; 
 be preventive – the Regulator needs where possible to act before risks 
materialise; 
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 be practicable – it needs need an approach that can be operated within the 
constraints of the information and resources available to it; and 
 be a referee not a player – the responsibility for ensuring that schemes are 
fully funded rests with trustees and employers with the help of their advisers. 
The regulator will not interfere with this responsibility where it is properly 
discharged. 
 
We would question whether the TPR’s approach combined with the guiding 
principles will be sufficient to protect the PPF or whether a much more prescriptive 
funding standard is required, such as:  
 a contribution rate set to remove a deficit over a short control period; 
 a discount rate for determining the value of liabilities based on the risk-free 
rate to remove the possibility of the equity risk premium being used as an 
excuse to lower the contribution rate; or 
 limits placed on the equity weighting in the pension fund. 
The Pension Protection Fund (2006) has itself chosen a highly conservative 
investment strategy for the funds it receives when it takes over insolvent pension 
schemes: 
 
Asset class Benchmark Total percentage 
allocation 
Cash 3-Month LIBOR 20% 
Global bonds J.P.Morgan 
Government Bond 
Index 
50% 
UK equities FTSE All-Share 12.5% 
Global equities FTSE Global 7.5% 
Property IPD 7.5% 
Currency overlay 3-Month LIBOR 2.5% 
 
 
The Pension Protection Fund (2006, paras 5.2.3 and 5.2.5) explains this choice as 
follows: the asset allocation has been set after maximising the expected excess return 
over the liability subject to the following constraints: 
  A risk budget of 4% p.a. at the total fund level. The risk budget is the 
maximum ex-ante standard deviation of the difference between the asset return 
and the return on the ‘liability benchmark’. This liability benchmark is the 
notional portfolio of assets that exactly matches the expected liability 
cashflows. 
 Each asset class is actively managed with tracking error limits and out-
performance targets such that the contribution of expected active manager 
excess returns to total out-performance is a maximum of 25%. Tracking error 
is the amount of divergence of the performance of the fund against the 
specified benchmark. 
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 A portfolio of derivatives known as a ‘swap overlay’ is applied to the portfolio 
above to change its cash flow profile to match that of the ‘liability 
benchmark’. This ensures that the sensitivities to real and nominal interest 
rates of the asset values closely match that of the liabilities. 
Given the investment strategy and the 4% total risk budget of 4%, the PPF expects the 
return on investments to exceed the return on the liability benchmark by 1.4% p.a. 
 
However, the PPF has made it clear that its investment strategy should not be taken as 
a blueprint by other pension funds. The investment strategy has been criticised for 
being too conservative: the consequence of foregoing the equity risk premium on 80% 
of its investments is likely to be higher contributions to the PPF levies according to 
critics, once again emphasing the tension in the tradeoff between the level of 
contributions on the one hand and the riskiness of the assets purchased with those 
contributions on the other (Pensions Week, 12 October 2006). 
 
6.5 Close supervision and the public exposure of companies that underfund their 
schemes  
Schemes with large deficits need to be watched and supervised very closely, and in 
this the PPF can learn a lot from the PBGC’s Early Warning Program. However, it is 
far from enough for the PPF merely to watch and supervise ‘problem’ funds: it also 
needs to provide incentives for sponsors to take their responsibilities seriously.  
One promising way to provide such an incentive is provided by a clause in the 2004 
Pensions Act that allows the Pensions Regulator to issue a ‘contribution notice’ (CN) 
requiring a person who has been involved (within the previous six years) in a 
deliberate act to avoid pension liabilities to put money into a pension scheme up to a 
specified amount or to issue a ‘financial support direction’ (FSD) requiring associated 
or connected persons to put financial support in place to guarantee the pension 
liabilities of an insufficiently resourced sponsor. A ‘clearance procedure’ with the 
Pensions Regulator can be used to ensure that actions (called type A events) will not 
lead to the issue of a CN or FSD for schemes in deficit. Examples of type A events 
are the payment of a large dividend, a large sale buyback, or the sale of the firm to 
another highly leveraged firm. These anti-avoidance powers are ‘unprecedented in the 
history of company law and the lifting of the corporate veil should send a shiver down 
the spine of all irresponsible directors, their advisers and professional indemnity 
insurers’ (Farr (2005, p. 21)). According to Farr, this should give comfort to trustees 
who are likely to be the largest material unsecured creditors of the sponsoring firm. At 
the same time, Farr suggests that these trustees should also seek the advice of 
specialists in creditor negotiations. 
7 Conclusions 
Unlike banks and insurance companies, UK pension funds are not regulated by the 
FSA and, moreover, are not subject to formal capital requirements. Instead they 
operate on a prudent person principle and make promises not guarantees. This goes a 
long way towards explaining why the current financial regulation of pension funds is 
so different from that of banks and life assurers. And, yet, as we have seen, it is 
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widely expected that pension funds should actually deliver the pension outcomes they 
promise, and in any case the new PPF itself is in the business of providing guarantees. 
Indeed, one can argue that the establishment of the PPF has radically altered the 
nature of the game by turning the promise of the scheme sponsor into a guarantee by 
the PPF that is (arguably, though the Government denies this) underwritten ultimately 
by the taxpayer.  
This raises some deep and difficult issues for both the regulation of the pension fund 
industry and for the PPF. One might argue, for example, that the similarities between 
pension funds and other financial institutions – life assurers especially – are so strong 
and compelling that it makes no sense to subject them to such different regulatory 
regimes. There is therefore an important issue of harmonisation (or lack thereof) 
between the capital regulation regimes applied to pension funds and those applied 
other financial institutions. Of course, our discussion does not address which of these 
regulatory regimes might be best, or whether they should all be replaced in favour of 
some other regime. If one accepts that the three-pillar approach is broadly ‘right’, at 
least in principle – as many do – then one would be tempted to suggest that it should 
be extended to cover pension funds too. On the other hand, many features of the 
three-pillar approach have been extensively and heavily criticised – such as its 
cumbersome inflexibility, its emphasis on the VaR risk measure17, its dependence on 
ad hoc assumptions, and so on, and even the principle of risk-based capital 
requirements is open to dispute (Danielsson (2003)). Good arguments can therefore be 
made against the whole approach. If one agrees with this line of reasoning, extending 
the three-pillar approach to pensions might make little sense, even if it did help to 
harmonize the regulatory treatment of pension funds and other financial institutions.   
There are also related issues arising from the very diverse ways in which different 
types of financial institution measure and manage their financial risks. The different 
types of financial institution have different approaches to risk management and vary 
considerably in their degrees of risk management sophistication. There is a general 
perception that the most ‘advanced’ risk management practices are to be found in 
capital markets institutions and banks. Insurance companies are generally perceived to 
be less sophisticated, although the better reinsurance companies would appear to be as 
good at risk management as any capital market institution or bank. For their part, 
pension funds are generally perceived to be backward in their risk management 
practices and we would share this assessment. Pension funds have a lot to learn about 
risk management. This is an especially important point when one also considers that 
pension fund risk management is an inherently complex matter: there are difficult 
valuation problems, complex embedded options, tricky risk factors (e.g., mortality), 
and so on.   
Yet different types of financial institution deal with different problems – they vary 
considerably in the types of risk they face, the horizons they operate to, the inherent 
complexity of the portfolios they handle, the liquidity of the markets in which they 
operate, and in many other ways besides – and it should go without saying that any 
transfer of risk management technology or practice into the pensions sector needs to 
take account of the uniqueness of the institutional contexts in which pension funds 
operate. These differences between different sectors of the financial services industry 
                                               
17
 For a critique of VaR, see Dowd and Blake (2006). 
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might also affect the ways in which these sectors can be regulated: what is feasible in 
one sector might not be feasible in another.  
Turning now to the PPF, we would argue that the PPF faces a daunting uphill 
struggle. It is essentially offering put options on pension scheme assets, but these 
options are highly complex and very hard to price.   
This said, the PPF would certainly help itself if it learned from the experience of its 
(not too successful) counterpart in the US, the PBGC: the PBGC does make a serious 
effort to monitor problem funds and anticipate undesirable outcomes, and many of its 
risk management practices – its Early Warning Program, and so on – are tried and 
tested, and would no doubt be useful to the PPF. But learning takes time and time may 
not be on its side. We would not rule out the possibility that one or two major ‘hits’ – 
a failure of a couple of firms the size of British Airways, for example – might bring it 
down much more quickly than anyone expected. And even if it manages to avoid this 
fate, its chances of surviving a major recession cannot be considered high. 
Perhaps the root problem is that the PPF has been established on a contradictory 
foundation. On the one hand, the Government insists that the PPF will provide 
pension guarantees, but on the other hand, the Government also insists that the PPF 
should be ‘on its own’ and not expect any Government bailout if it gets into 
difficulties. We would argue that the Government’s position is contradictory, because 
the PPF has only a restricted capacity to protect its own solvency. Any ‘guarantees’ it 
provides are therefore inevitably limited ones, and the Government is reluctant to face 
up to the reality that this implies. We are not suggesting that the Government should 
underwrite the PPF – far from it – but we are only pointing out that the Government 
has not thought its position through. The inevitable consequence of this position is 
that the costs of financial regulation will increase as both the Pensions Regulator and 
the Pension Protection Fund attempt to protect themselves as the system gets into 
difficulties.18 
This lack of ‘joined up thinking’ is also illustrated by the fact that the very Act of 
Parliament that established the PPF also replaced the MFR with a much weaker 
scheme-specific funding standard, i.e., the Act put more weight on the funding 
standard whilst simultaneously weakening it, and yet the funding standard was not 
strong to begin with.  
To end on a really gloomy note, consider the following: Since the average FRS17 
funding level for the UK’s top 350 companies is about 80%, these companies would 
need an extra £150bn to cover the PPF level of funding (Pensions Week, 25 April 
2005). This indicates that in its first month after launch, the PPF was providing in 
excess of £150bn of insurance cover against annual levy premiums of just £300m. 
However, Standard & Poor’s carried out a study in 2005 of potential claims against 
the PPF, based on the post-1981 default experience of 340 top UK companies, and 
their results suggest that annual claims on the PPF will exceed £300m. Even under the 
most optimistic assumptions, under which the PPF would recover 40% of the deficit 
from the defaulted sponsor, the annual claim on the PPF would be £670m. This does 
                                               
18
 At the time of writing this article, these were the type of headlines that were common: ‘Funding regs 
trigger higher costs’ (Pensions Week, 30 October 2006) and ‘Pensions safety net levy rises by 50%’ 
(Daily Telegraph, 28 October 2006). 
 30 
not look good. And, in the first month alone of the PPF’s existence, it received claims 
in excess of £1bn with the collapse of Turner & Newell (liabilities of £875m) and 
Rover (liabilities of £400m). If this is a good start, one wonders what a bad one would 
look like.  
Our overall conclusions are therefore deeply disturbing: right from its birth, the PPF 
faces the permanent risk of insolvency as a consequence of the moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and, especially, systemic risks that it faces. If this unfortunate eventuality 
happens, the Government will then face the unpleasant choice of whether to bail out 
the PPF or allow a mandatory Government-sponsored insurance system to collapse.  
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